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Abstract: This paper analyzes two criminal networks belonging to the ‗Ndrangheta, a mafia-type 
criminal organization originating from Calabria, a Southern Italian Region.  
The literature on criminal networks argues that differences in the degree and betweenness centrality 
measures may highlight strategic positioning patterns for criminals capable of reducing risk of 
detection and maintaining control over the criminal activities at the same time. However, the 
identification of this strategic pattern is difficult whenever, as frequently happens, centrality measures 
are highly correlated 
The paper analyzes network positioning in two mafia-type organizations, where degree and 
betweenness centrality were highly correlated. The analysis focuses on specific characteristics of the 
individuals in the networks (task, hierarchy and social status within each group) and how these relate 
to network positioning (centrality scores and clustering coefficient) and the outcome of the criminal 
proceedings (accusation, arrest, conviction and sentence in months). Results show that task and 
hierarchy are highly associated with network centrality, but also with accusation, arrest and 
conviction. Contrarily, high social status within the networks shows limited association with network 
centrality and the outcome of criminal proceedings. This may reveal patterns of strategic positioning 
which could not be identified solely though network analysis measures. 
1. Strategic positioning in criminal networks 
The literature on drug trafficking has repeatedly highlighted that drug markets are particularly flexible 
and dynamic environments (Benson and Decker 2010; Bouchard and Ouellet 2011:70-71; Desroches 
2003; Dorn, Levi, and King 2005:14-15; Dorn, Murji, and South 1992:ix; Paoli 2004:201; Pearson 
and Hobbs 2001:11-12; Reuter 2009; Reuter and Haaga 1989:54-55). The characteristics of drug (and 
other) criminal markets inevitably influence the type of criminal groups operating within them. 
(Reuter 1983; Paoli 2004:203) Several constraints related to the illegality of the product makes it 
difficult for large criminal enterprises to emerge and continue for longer periods. Contrarily, small, 
inconstant groups are formed with fast changing partnerships (Reuter 1983; Eck and Gersh 2000). 
Larger structured groups, such as mafia-type groups are exceptional (Reuter 2009:16). Whenever they 
participate in drug markets, mafia-type organizations do not seem to achieve monopoly positions 
(Becchi 1996:125-127; Paoli 2002a:145-147; Varese 2006a:433-438). On the contrary, they adapt to 
the dynamic environment with very limited relevance to the internal formal hierarchy (Paoli 
2004:198-199). 
In general, criminal groups, including mafia-type groups, appear constantly facing a trade-off between 
security (minimizing risk) and efficiency (maximizing opportunities/profits) (Bouchard and Nguyen 
2010:132; Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007). 
The particular nature of illegal markets has brought several scholars in the last decades to call for the 
application of social network analysis (hereinafter SNA) in this field. They advocated the usefulness 
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of SNA methods not only to analyze, but also to improve enforcement of, criminal networks and 
particularly organized crime (Lupsha 1980; Davis 1981; Lupsha 1983; Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1990; 
Sparrow 1991b, 1991a). Most of these now ―classic‖ contributions, albeit with some remarkable 
exceptions (e.g. Lupsha 1983; Baker and Faulkner 1993), did not engage in empirical analysis of 
criminal groups, possibly due to the limited availability of datasets and software.
1
 Only ten years ago, 
Coles still complained about the ―failure by criminologists to adopt Social Network Analysis 
techniques and concepts in the investigation of criminal networks, particularly of organized crime‖ 
(2001:58). The last decade has finally brought an increasing number of empirical studies on organized 
crime, and particularly drug trafficking, with social network methods (Natarajan 2000; Xu and Chen 
2003; Natarajan 2006; Varese 2006b; Morselli and Giguere 2006; Morselli and Petit 2007; Morselli et 
al. 2007; Morselli and Roy 2008; Malm, Kinney, and Pollard 2008; Heber 2008; Morselli 2009a, 
2009b; Bouchard and Nguyen 2010; Morselli 2010; Bouchard and Ouellet 2011). The application of 
SNA to criminal groups and particularly to drug trafficking groups has provided important 
contributions in achieving better knowledge about the structure of criminal organizations and markets. 
The positioning of specific criminals is among the most interesting topics studies by the mentioned 
contributions. 
Since the beginning, the identification of the most important individuals in a criminal network has 
received particular attention (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1990:76-77; Davis 1981:18). This is hardly 
surprising, given the implications of such endeavors from both a research and policy perspective. The 
majority of SNA techniques revolve around the concept of centrality to identify the most important 
subjects in a network. Several measures of centrality have been developed for different purposes, the 
choice depending on the available data and research objectives (Hanneman and Riddle 2005:147; 
McGloin and Kirk 2010:219-220; Morselli 2009b:38; Scott 2000:82; Wasserman and Faust 
1994:169). Increasingly, scholars have realized that the most straightforward measure of centrality, 
degree centrality, may be particularly misleading in identifying the most important nodes in criminal 
networks. In general, degree centrality reflects active involvement in the network activities, but in the 
case of criminal networks it was argued that ―degree centrality makes a person vulnerable‖ (Baker and 
Faulkner 1993:854). Indeed, having a high number of direct contacts makes a node particularly visible 
and consequently an easy target for law enforcement. Alternatively, betweenness centrality was 
considered a more useful measure (Sparrow 1991b:264-265). Betweenness centrality calculates the 
number of times a node lies in the shortest paths between two other nodes in the same network. In the 
context of criminal networks, betweenness centrality may reveal more strategic positioning within a 
network, ensuring less visibility while allowing control to be maintained over the flow of information 
(Morselli 2009b:39-40, 2010). This interpretation has been supported by empirical evidence. Baker 
and Faulkner showed that degree centrality increased the chances of conviction and the penalties in 
price-fixing conspiracies (Baker and Faulkner 1993). In his studies on the Hells Angels in Quebec, 
Morselli found that subjects with higher status within the motorcycle group had higher betweenness 
centrality and lower degree centrality compared to middle and low status members (Morselli 2009a, 
2009b). More recently, he also found that ―the highest proportion of arrests was found in the high 
degree centrality/low-betweenness-centrality group (Morselli 2010:389). In another study, he found 
that members of the Bo-Gars gangs had lower direct, but higher indirect connectivity than other gangs 
and non-gang members. This was reflected in lower arrest rates (Morselli 2009b:156-157).  
The reviewed literature argued that degree and betweenness centrality reflect different strategic 
positions within criminal networks. The first signals visibility and vulnerability, while the latter 
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 Recently, Mastrobuoni and Patacchini have demonstrated that, at least for the data issue, past law 
enforcement databases provided interesting opportunities for the application of SNA (2010). 
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provides a strategic brokering power. This strategic positioning pattern should provide a double 
advantage within criminal networks. Firstly, it should allow better control over criminal activities and 
therefore it should differentiate the criminal leaders from the other individuals. Secondly, it should 
grant better protection from detection and conviction along with lower sentencing. Unfortunately, this 
interpretation depends heavily from a specific distribution of the mentioned centrality measures in 
criminal networks. In the case of Hells Angels, the two centrality measures were significantly and 
positively correlated (Pearson‘s r=0.4) (Morselli 2010:388). This revealed that direct and indirect 
connectivity in the network followed different patterns. 
In most criminal networks, however, it may be expected that centrality measures show higher 
correlation coefficients, to a point where the overlap between degree and betweenness centrality 
leaves little room to identify strategic positioning.
2
 In such cases, SNA centrality measures alone may 
not allow to identify strategic positioning of individuals. However, application of multiple analyses 
may provide data allowing to identify patterns of strategic positioning not relying exclusively on 
centrality measures. Indeed, several studies have identified the main tasks, the status and other 
characteristics of individuals in criminal networks through a content analysis of intercepted 
conversations (Natarajan 2000, 2006; Varese 2006b; Campana 2011). Content analysis, in its various 
forms, is indeed compatible with SNA methods and its importance has been acknowledged by 
Morselli.
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In this perspective, this study aimed at identifying strategic positioning within two drug trafficking 
groups of the ‗Ndrangheta, a mafia-type organization from Calabria, a Southern Italian region. The 
first objective was to identify strategic positioning within the criminal networks, which may 
distinguish strategically positioned individuals from the others. The second objective was to verify 
whether the identified strategic pattern reflects on the conviction and sentencing of individuals within 
the two ´Ndrangheta groups. 
The next section introduces some background information about the ‗Ndrangheta. Section 3 presents 
the methodology, while section 4 discusses the results of the network positioning and the outcome of 
the investigations and trials. The last section contains the conclusions. 
2. The ‘Ndrangheta and network positioning 
This study aims to contribute to the debate about strategic positioning in criminal networks. For this 
purpose, it applied multiple analyses to two drug trafficking groups of the ´Ndrangheta.  
The historical origins of the ‗Ndrangheta reach back to the nineteenth century, although some 
elements suggest that it may have had precursors even before that period (Ciconte 1992; Gratteri and 
Nicaso 2009:25). The ‗Ndrangheta is composed of a number of different groups, called ‗ndrine, which 
exercise control over a specific territory. Unlike the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the ‗ndrine mostly consist 
of members of the same family (Paoli 2003; Varese 2006a). This reinforces the cohesion of the 
criminal groups. The ‗Ndrangheta further enhances the strength of the ‗ndrine by fostering a shared 
culture based on rituals, affiliation ceremonies, formal ranks and mythology.
4
 The family, cultural and 
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 ―More often than not, criminal network participants are balancing both forms of centrality‖ (Morselli 
2010:386). 
3
 ―Content analysis is indeed the next step toward enriching the various analyses conducted 
throughout this book‖ (Morselli 2009b:164) 
4
 Seizures have been made of written ―regulations‖ which describe the rules of the organization and its 
secret oaths (Gratteri and Nicaso 2009; Malafarina 1978; Paoli 2003). The ‗Ndrangheta has specific 
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hierarchical ties reinforce trust among the members and give the ‗Ndrangheta exceptional solidity 
(Paoli 2003). As proof of this, very few pentiti (collaborators with justice) come from the 
‗Ndrangheta, as opposed to the Sicilian Mafia or the Neapolitan Camorra (Paoli 1994:216).  
One of the main criminal activities of the ‗Ndrangheta is the trafficking of cocaine. The ‗Ndrangheta 
has exploited its organizational structure to establish solid partnerships with Colombian cocaine 
suppliers (Paoli 1994:222-223). Several official reports maintain that the ‗Ndrangheta has achieved a 
primary role in the Italian cocaine market, outmatching other mafia-type organizations, such as the 
Sicilian Mafia and the Neapolitan Camorra (CPA 2008; Paoli 2004:201).  
The analysis of the structure of two drug trafficking organizations linked to the ‗Ndrangheta provides 
an interesting opportunity to identify strategic positioning patterns within two highly structured 
criminal groups. Indeed, the ‗Ndrangheta normally operates with a clear division of tasks within the 
members of the organization. Furthermore, its mafia-type nature implies that different levels of 
leadership or social status may be identified, either through the formal ranks within the organization‘s 
hierarchy or the informal hierarchy that may be observed from the content analysis of the 
conversations. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Case studies and data sources 
This paper analyzed two case studies, relating to two investigations, called Chalonero and Stupor 
Mundi respectively, and coordinated by the Antimafia Prosecutor‘s Office of Reggio Calabria.5 
Information on the two cases came from multiple sources, including judicial files (e.g. arrest warrants, 
final judgments) and other sources (the literature, official reports by law enforcement agencies or 
prosecution offices and news reports). 
Operation Chalonero was performed by the Carabinieri of the Provincial Command of Reggio 
Calabria. The investigation lasted several years and ended in January 2007 with the arrest of 16 
people, ordered by the GIP of Reggio Calabria. The phone interceptions covered the period from 
August 2003 to June 2004. Operation Chalonero focused on criminal groups belonging to the 
‗Ndrangheta and trafficking cocaine from South America to Italy, through Spain. The drug was sold 
in Italy, particularly in the areas of Milan, Florence, Bologna, Rome and in Calabria (DIA 2007:106).  
Operation Stupor Mundi was performed by the Antidrug Operational Group of the Guardia di 
Finanza of Reggio Calabria. The investigation lasted for years and ended in May 2007 with the arrest 
of 38 people by order of the Court of Reggio Calabria. The phone interceptions covered the period 
from June 2002 to April 2004. The operation focused on criminal groups belonging to the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ranks for its members, with an elaborate formal hierarchy consisting of two main layers: the higher 
society (società maggiore) and lower society (società minore). There are multiple ranks within each 
layer (Paoli 2003). 
5
 The two investigations were identified in cooperation with the Antimafia Investigative Directorate 
(Direzione Investigativa Antimafia in Italian, hereinafter DIA). The DIA is a specialized unit, 
headquartered in Rome and with several offices across the Italian territory. Created in 1991, it is 
specialized in the investigation of mafia-type cases and tasked with performing both criminal 
investigations and strategic analysis. The DIA provided access to a number of judicial documents 
relating to approximately a dozen major investigations characterized by the involvement of the 
‗Ndrangheta in drug trafficking. The two operations were selected in order to be broadly comparable 
(in terms of the size and type of criminal activities). 
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‗Ndrangheta and trafficking cocaine from South America to Italy, through Spain and the Netherlands. 
The drug was sold in Italy, particularly in the areas of Milan, Turin, Rome and in Calabria (CPA 
2008:195 and 235).  
The main analyses were conducted on the information contained in two court orders issued by the 
preliminary investigation judge (Giudice per le indagini preliminari, hereinafter GIP) upon request by 
the prosecution. The purpose of the court orders was to impose preventive measures (misure 
cautelari) upon suspects and particularly to remand them in custody. From a comparative perspective, 
these court orders are broadly similar to arrest warrants in other jurisdictions. To justify the decision 
to remand the suspects in custody, the court must provide detailed motivations. Consequently, the two 
documents provided a description of the accused individuals (e.g. name, birth date, residence, 
citizenship) and their activities. In particular, since both investigations were largely based on the 
interception of phone conversations and monitoring of suspects, they also reported data on the 
communication flows among the members of the two networks and a number of conversations were 
partly or entirely reported. The court orders provided different information about the individuals 
mentioned in the investigations (e.g. name and surname, gender, nationality). Further, these sources 
provided information on whether the individuals were accused of any crime (i.e. they were the targets 
of the investigations) and arrested at the end of the operations (Table 1). 
Additional sources provided information about the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Several 
judgments were collected in cooperation with the Antimafia Prosecutor‘s Office of Reggio Calabria. 
Unfortunately, information about conviction and sentencing was available only for a limited number 
of individuals. This is because, in the Italian criminal justice system, once an investigation is closed, 
the development of the proceedings may take different paths for the accused persons and may last 
several years. Indeed, for Chalonero, two first degree judgments and one appeal decision were 
available. For Stupor Mundi, three first degree judgments were collected. Overall, the collected 
decisions provided information about acquittal or conviction for about 17 individuals out of 46 and for 
40 out of 45 accused for Chalonero and Stupor Mundi respectively (Table 1). 
Table 1. Information on the different stages of the criminal proceedings  
 
Accused N/acc. Tot 
 
Arrested N/arr. Tot 
 
Convicted Acquitted N/a Tot 
Stupor Mundi 45 28 73 
 
38 7 45 
 
26 14 5 45 
Chalonero 46 15 61 
 
11 35 46 
 
12 5 29 46 
 
The selected sources allowed to explore the social dynamics of the two ‗Ndrangheta groups. The 
literature has frequently used similar judicial sources for analysis, including SNA methods (Heber 
2008; Malm, Bichler, and Van De Walle 2009; Malm et al. 2008; Morselli 2010; Morselli and 
Giguere 2006; Morselli et al. 2007; Morselli and Petit 2007; Natarajan 2000, 2006; Natarajan and 
Belanger 1998; Natarajan, Zanella, and Yu 2010; Morselli 2009a; Campana 2011). This study 
followed different research methods, also considering previous studies on drug trafficking and other 
criminal groups (Natarajan 2000; Varese 2006b; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009b, 2010). 
3.2. Identification of the main individuals 
For each individual in each document, this study identified the number of contacts (other individuals 
with whom he/she had talked or had met), conversations (the number of telephone conversations in 
which he or she had participated, independently from the number of contacts), and meetings (the 
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number of meetings in which he or she had participated, independently from the number of contacts).
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Relational information (participation in phone calls and/or in meetings) was available for 92 and 128 
individuals for Chalonero and Stupor Mundi, respectively. Considering the different time spans of the 
two operations, and the number of individuals involved, the ratios of communications per individual 
per month are broadly comparable.
7
  
Analysis of the relational data in the two court orders highlighted that most individuals participated 
only marginally in the networks. A number of individuals were in contact with only one other subject 
and participated in a low number of communications. Contrarily, a limited number of individuals had 
a very high number of contacts and participated in a high number of communications. The results are 
consistent with the findings of previous research. Several studies have found that a small proportion 
of the individuals in a criminal group account for the majority of the communications (Natarajan 
2000:277, 2006:179; Morselli 2009b:51).  
Given the concentration of the contacts, it was decided to remove from the analysis the individuals 
with only one contact, to exclude people with very limited participation in the group activities. 
Consequently, the study concentrated on a subset of 61 and 73 individuals for Chalonero and Stupor 
Mundi respectively.
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3.3. The analyses on the two groups 
The first analysis of this study aimed at identifying the main role of each individual within the two 
groups (Natarajan 2000, 2006; Morselli and Giguere 2006). As argued by previous studies, 
individuals charged with organizing smuggling operations and connecting producers/suppliers with 
buyers have key brokering roles in criminal networks. For this reason, the analysis identified those 
brokers and classified each individual as a trafficker. Other tasks (suppliers, buyers, couriers, support 
and retailer) were identified with interesting overlaps between the two organizations (Table 2).  
The second analysis aimed at identifying the importance of each individual within the two criminal 
groups with methodologies different from SNA. For this purpose, two different strategies were 
followed.  
The first strategy relied on information from the prosecution and the court. Indeed, both judicial 
documents provided information about the organizational structure of the two groups and namely 
about belonging to the mafia group and being a boss within each group (Table 2). This is because in 
both cases the most important charge was that of belonging to a drug trafficking organization. The 
court orders included the court‘s assessment of the evidence relating to this charge and therefore 
allowed to classify each individual in the two groups as either member of the ‗Ndrangheta or non 
member. Furthermore, the prosecution and the court also identified the leaders (´´bosses) of each 
criminal organization. This is because the Italian criminal law attaches particular relevance to 
leadership roles within organized drug trafficking groups, providing higher penalties. In this way it 
was possible to classify 5 individuals as ―bosses‖ in Chalonero and 6 in Stupor Mundi. 
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 For each operation, the analysis coded each individual as N1, N2, ... in order to prevent direct 
identification. 
7
 The ratios total communications (phone calls + meetings) per individuals per months were 0.5 and 
0.64 for Chalonero and Stupor Mundi respectively. 
8
 Similar ―trimming‖ operations are routinely conducted in criminal network studies (Natarajan 2000, 
2006; Morselli 2009a:152) 
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The above mentioned classification had the advantage of selecting a restricted number of individuals 
as the criminal leaders. However, the main disadvantage was that it relied on information from the 
prosecution and the court, with very limited possibilities to verify its reliability and accuracy. To 
overcome this problem, the second strategy relied on the assessment of the relative status of the 
individuals drawing from previous literature (Natarajan 2000, 2006). The analysis applied a six-code 
scheme to the communications among the individuals in the groups.
9
 The above coding scheme was 
applied to one conversation for every couple of individuals for which conversations were available in 
the court orders.
10
 Each individual was attributed a status score resulting from application of the 
coding scheme (one point for the presence of each of the above listed codes).
11
 In case of individuals 
with status scores from multiple conversations, the status score was the mean of the scores of the 
single conversations. Furthermore, the individuals in each group were divided into three status classes 
according to their status score (Table 2).
12
 
                                                     
9
 The coding scheme was as follows: 
(a) express (dis)satisfaction  
(b) request information 
(c) not provide information 
(d) give orders 
(e) not seek clarification of orders 
(f) not use the 3rd person singular or 2nd person plural when talking to others.  
10
 The second conversation for every dyad was randomly selected. When a dyad was involved in a 
single conversation only, the analysis focused on that conversation. 
For some individuals there were no conversations available. This was because these individuals had 
participated in meetings but not in conversations. For these individuals (n=17 and n=27 for Chalonero 
and Stupor Mundi, respectively), the status score was attributed on the basis of the detailed analysis of 
the overall context described in the court order. In particular, the study attributed the status score on 
the basis of the considerations of the court and of the prosecution and of the status of individuals 
performing the same task or with the same role within each criminal network. For example, in 
Chalonero, N1 was a fugitive, and he did not participate in telephone calls in order to avoid being 
tracked and arrested. At the same time, he was the boss of the organization, as evident both from the 
considerations of the court and the fact that his agreement was required for major decisions. For this 
reason, he received a status score of 4, equal to that of the highest-status individuals identified in the 
same operation. 
11
 Two coders independently coded a sample of conversations to assess the reliability of the coding 
scheme. The mean correlation between the two coders was 0.85, in line with Natarajan‘s studies 
(2006, 182; 2000, 280). 
12
 The medium status class included subjects with status scores within the mean +/- a half standard 
deviation; the low status class comprised status scores lower than the mean minus half standard 
deviation and the high status class included individuals with a status score higher than the mean plus 
half standard deviation. The classes ranges were very similar between the two networks. The 
thresholds were 2.5 and 3.1 for Chalonero and 2.2 and 2.9 for Stupor Mundi. 
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Table 2. Number of individuals per task, hierarchy and status 
 
 
Chalonero  Stupor Mundi 
General information 
Total individuals 61  73 
Foreigner 12  2 
Female 4  4 
Task 
Supplier N/a  14 
Trafficker 16  9 
Buyer 19  15 
Courier 12  N/a 
Support  26  16 
Retailer N/a  14 
Hierarchy 
Non member 44  37 
‗Ndrangheta member 12  30 
Boss 5  6 
Status class 
High status 10  23 
Medium status 29  18 
Low status 22  32 
Status score 
Min score 2  1.7 
Max score 4  4.5 
Mean score 2.8  2.6 
St. dev. 0.6  0.6 
 
Finally, the study applied SNA methods to the two criminal groups.
13
 It extracted information about 
phone calls and meetings among from the two court orders and created two valued, square matrices, 
indicating whether any two individuals were in contact and how many communications occurred 
between them. Also, valued matrices were transformed in binary matrices to perform some routines.
14
  
Consistently with the purpose of identifying strategic positioning patterns within the two groups, 
degree and betweenness centrality were calculated. Degree centrality was measured on both binary 
and valued networks, the latter indicating the number of contacts instead of the mere presence of a 
contact. In addition, the analysis calculated the clustering coefficient for each node, which measures 
the density of the neighborhood of each node (i.e. all the nodes directly connected to a given node) 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005:124). The clustering coefficient measures the likelihood that two 
individuals connected to the same third individual are themselves connected (Morselli 2009b:40-41). 
Although Morselli suggested that it should be considered a measure of direct connectivity (such as 
degree or eigenvector centrality), this study used it in a different way (Morselli 2009b:136-137). 
Indeed, having a high coefficient means that a node‘s contacts are also in contact among them. 
Contrarily, a low score implies that the density of the neighborhood of a node is low. In the context of 
a criminal organization, having contacts scarcely connected may be an advantage, meaning that a 
node is bridging different individuals which are not in contact. Furthermore, higher clustering may 
imply low secrecy, since information may be shared among the other nodes.
15
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 The network analysis was performed using the Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).  
14
 The network analysis was performed on undirected matrixes. The use of directed matrices would 
have excluded a relevant set of information, namely the data concerning meetings, which could not be 
gathered in directed form.  
15
 The clustering coefficient is highly influenced by the size of a node‘s neighbourhood. With a high 
number of direct contacts, it is less likely that they will be densely connected. For this reason, the 
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The three centrality measures (degree, valued degree and betweenness) were extremely correlated in 
both networks.
16
 Given the very high level of overlap among the centrality measures, strategic 
positioning had to be explored through methods different from the analysis of the different 
distributions of betweenness and degree centrality.  
The results of the mentioned analyses were used to identify patterns of strategic positioning within the 
two ‗Ndrangheta groups. 
3.4. Limitations 
The analysis of this study had some limitations. Most of them regard the reliability of criminal justice 
sources for the proposed analyses. Recent contributions suggest that network properties and measures 
are strong even if randomly tested for missing data (Morselli 2009b:48; Xu and Chen 2008:63-64). 
Nevertheless, some caveats are necessary.  
Obviously, as with most judicial documents, the data collection served mainly criminal procedural 
and evidentiary purposes. The sources were inevitably affected by the point of view of the police and 
the prosecution. Account for this influence has been given above, when presenting the analysis of the 
hierarchy of the two groups. However, law enforcement strategies may have further influenced the 
boundaries and characteristics of the groups investigated (Lampe 2009:95). Lastly, some parts of the 
criminal groups may have been omitted and/or overlooked, either because of the criminals‘ strategies 
to deflect attention or because of the limited resources available to law enforcement.  
This study is inevitably exposed to the above problems. Unfortunately, these seem common to most 
studies on criminal networks, and the literature frequently highlights these issues (Malm and Bichler 
2011:20-22; Morselli 2009b:41-50; Xu and Chen 2008:63; Lampe 2009). Some elements suggest that 
these problems were acceptably limited for the two groups studied. Firstly, Chalonero and Stupor 
Mundi were long-lasting investigations, so that the possibility that important individuals in the 
networks were missed should be relatively low (Morselli 2009b:49). Secondly, the direct analysis of 
conversations adopted for the identification of task and status scores allowed to focus directly on 
intercepted conversations. Although the selection of the conversations included in the court orders 
depended on the choices of the prosecution and the court, it seems unlikely that conversations 
containing particularly relevant information on the criminal activities may have been omitted. In any 
case, directed analysis of the conversations allowed to limit the influence of the criminal justice 
system on the results. Finally, the analysis of two broadly similar groups prevented the results from 
being influenced by particular features of one single criminal network.  
Overall, although the study of criminal networks though the selected methods cannot be completely 
free from limitations, the growing literature applying similar judicial sources for similar analyses 
suggests that the methodology of the present study is reasonably fit for this purpose (Natarajan 2000; 
Varese 2006b; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009b; Campana 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
clustering coefficient is always presented along with the number of pairs (i.e. the number of possible 
combinations among a node‘s direct contacts).  
16
 Pearson‘s r ranged from 0.946 to 0.978 in Chalonero and from 0.909 to 0.966 in Stupor Mundi. All 
correlations were statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1. Strategic positioning in the ‘Ndrangheta 
Given the high correlation of centrality measures, the study focused at first on the relation among 
tasks, hierarchy and status. In both groups, traffickers and bosses had higher status scores than other 
individuals (Table 3). As for the traffickers, it appears that this specific task is of vital importance in 
drug trafficking organizations, including mafia-type ones. These individuals probably tend to be more 
experienced and skilled in comparison to other criminals and this may reflect on their higher status. 
This comes as no surprise. Traffickers are amenable to the concept of brokers in criminal networks, a 
function whose importance has been abundantly highlighted in the literature (Morselli 2009b:15; 
Coles 2001).
 17
 Similarly, the analysis of the status confirms that bosses have higher status than simple 
‗Ndrangheta members and non members (although the difference was not statistically significant in 
Chalonero, probably because of the limited number of ‗Ndrangheta members and bosses). 
Interestingly, in both groups all bosses were traffickers. 
Table 3. Mean status score by task and by hierarchy in both groups 
  
Chalonero  Stupor Mundi 
  
N Mean status sc.  N Mean status sc. 
Task 
N/trafficker 52 2.70*  57 2.43** 
Trafficker 9 3.16*  16 2.98** 
Hierarchy 
N/member 49 2.71  43 2.50** 
Member 7 2.91  24 2.43** 
Boss 5 3.2  6 3.38** 
 **p< .01, *p< .05  
Note: in both criminal groups, the significance test refers to the differences of the mean status scores 
for each group of the task and hierarchy (ANOVA) 
 
 
The introduction of network measures in the analysis provides a more complex picture (Table 4). In 
both groups traffickers, bosses and members of the ‗Ndrangheta showed higher centrality measures. 
They had more contacts and also more frequent communications (valued degree). Furthermore, 
betweenness centrality scores are very high for traffickers, and even higher for bosses. Overall, a 
small set of traffickers/bosses is crucially central in the flow of information within the criminal 
networks. This signals that these individuals play a crucial role in connecting different nodes trough 
the drug trafficking chain. In part, the findings support the view that the specific activities within the 
drug trafficking chain account for the positioning of the individuals within the network. This may 
confirm that also mafia-type organizations adapt to the criminal markets they are operating in (Paoli 
2002b, 2004).  
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 ―Brokers are neither patrons nor clients. They play in between and what past research has 
demonstrated is that individuals who are capable of maintaining such a stance are generally well-
respected, higher achievers, and strategic participants in the networks that surround them‖ (Morselli 
2009b:17). 
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Table 4. Mean individual network measures by task, status class, hierarchy and traffickers-by-
status class 
 
 
Chalonero  Stupor Mundi 
 
  
N Degree 
Valued 
degree 
Betweenn
ess 
Clus. 
coeff. 
N.pairs  N Degree 
Valued 
degree 
Between
ness 
Clus. 
coeff. 
N.pairs 
Task N/trafficker 52 0.050** 8.4** 0.014** 0.838** 3.8**  57 0.053** 17.6** 0.004** 0.814** 8** 
Trafficker 9 0.198** 66.6** 0.138** 0.404** 112.6**  16 0.191** 177.0** 0.071** 0.468** 165.6** 
Hier. 
N/member 49 0.047** 6.6** 0.003** 0.871** 3.3**  43 0.047** 10.3** 0.005** 0.838** 5.8** 
Member 7 0.102** 28.0** 0.040** 0.493** 19.7**  24 0.101** 64.0** 0.018** 0.649** 41.0** 
Boss 5 0.274** 103.2** 0.222** 0.217** 183.0**  6 0.278** 309.2** 0.118** 0.358** 312.7** 
Status 
class 
High st. 10 0.075 15.6 0.027 0.717 14.0  23 0.093 62.5 0.023 0.643 42.2 
Medium st. 29 0.089 24.6 0.042 0.720 34.4  18 0.095 74.0 0.032 0.780 80.7 
Low st. 22 0.048 7.4 0.003 0.870 3.4  32 0.070 33.3 0.008 0.782 21.5 
Traff.
*statu
s 
Traf*hi. st. 3 0.122 25.7 0.036 0.516 33.3  10 0.144 119.8 0.046 0.466 87.1 
Traf*med st. 6 0.236 87.0 0.189 0.349 152.2  1 0.708 947.0 0.505 0.094 1275.0 
Traf*low st. 0 N/a  5 0.181 137.6 0.034 0.549 100.6 
**p< .01, *p< .05 
Note: in both criminal groups, the significance test refers to the differences of the mean network 
measures for each group of the task, hierarchy, status class and traffickers*status (ANOVA). The 
differences for traffickers*status were not statistically significant probably due to the extremely low 
number of cases. 
Although straightforward, this picture seems to contrast with the model of a hierarchical organization 
as hypothesized in the literature and as could be expected given the characteristics of the ‗Ndrangheta. 
In hierarchical networks, it may be expected that leaders are only in contact with a limited number of 
lieutenants or collaborators, allowing them to maintain strict control over the criminal activities 
minimizing their visibility (Jackson, Herbrink, and Jansen 1996). Contrarily, in the two ´Ndrangheta 
groups, the bosses were directly involved in the criminal activities. Further, no strategic positioning 
could be identified, as in previous studies where the leading individuals had higher betweenness but 
lower degree centrality than other nodes (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Morselli 2010, 2009a, 
2009b:chap. 9). These results confirm that ―covert networks are not generally capable of trading 
efficiency for security‖(Morselli et al. 2007:151). This applies also to mafia-type organizations. 
Although traffickers, bosses and members of the ‗Ndrangheta were remarkably higher in betweenness 
centrality than other individuals, they also had higher degree centrality.  
Multiple interpretations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, may explain this picture.  
Firstly, the theoretical hypothesis formulated by Jackson and colleagues (1996) may have overlooked 
the specific features of criminal activities and markets. Here, the illicit nature of the activities implies 
that security (direct control by bosses of the activities) prevails over efficiency (indirect control and 
delegation). Delegation may increase the risks of information diffusion and detection and therefore it 
is a luxury that criminal organizations can rarely afford.  
Furthermore, the observed networks may be influence by law enforcement perception. In part, this is 
no surprise, since the data were drawn from law enforcement sources and collected with purposes 
different from the analysis of the structure of the groups from a network perspective. Police 
surveillance may have focused on the most visible players and this may further explain why all bosses 
were also traffickers. Indeed, the content analysis of the conversations revealed that individuals 
identified as bosses frequently did not enjoy particular respect from other individuals. For example, 
they frequently received orders and treated other individuals with deference. In particular, bosses may 
have been identified by law enforcement agencies depending on particular investigative strategies and 
their sheer visibility in the criminal trades. 
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A last interpretation provides more interesting insight and is based on the inclusion of the status 
scores in the analysis (Table 4). Indeed, in both groups, individuals in the high status class were not 
the most central nodes. Contrarily, individuals with medium status had higher centrality scores 
(although the differences of the means were not statistically different).  
These findings highlight a specific structure of the two ‗Ndrangheta networks. High status individuals 
remained more detached from the core of the criminal activities, leaving medium status individuals in 
central positions. As a further element supporting this interpretation, in both ‗Ndrangheta networks 
high status individuals had lower clustering coefficients, although they generally had smaller 
neighborhoods. This is counterintuitive, since the clustering coefficient is generally indirectly 
correlated to the size of a node‘s neighborhood. Conversely, medium status individuals had larger 
neighborhoods, but also higher clustering coefficients. This may reveal that such nodes are largely 
redundant and they actual brokering power is more limited than high status nodes. These were 
connecting subjects who are less connected among themselves and this pattern highlights their 
strategic position within the two criminal networks.  
Closer analysis of traffickers within different status classes provides further confirmation to this 
picture (Table 4). In Chalonero, medium status traffickers have higher centrality scores than the high 
status individuals (there were no low status traffickers). In Stupor Mundi, high status traffickers have 
centrality scores lower than the only medium status trafficker and even lower than low status 
traffickers. Further, their clustering coefficient is lower, despite having smaller neighborhoods than 
the other traffickers. 
The strategic positioning pattern is recognizable in Figure 1 and   
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Figure 2 where the nodes were plotted against their status score and task. In both networks, traffickers 
were strongly connected among them and communicated very frequently (solid black and solid grey 
lines). High status individuals maintained less frequent contacts, remaining in a more detached 
position.  
The network structure emerging from these data suggests that a specific pattern of network 
positioning was in place in the ‗Ndrangheta groups. However, this could not be identified solely 
through the analysis of degree and betweenness centrality as suggested by the previous literature 
(Baker and Faulkner 1993; Morselli 2010, 2009a, 2009b:chap. 9). In the two ´Ndrangheta networks, 
medium status individuals had both direct and indirect connectivity higher than high status 
individuals. High status individuals were less central, but frequently had more strategic (less 
redundant) connections, as highlighted by lower clustering coefficient This pattern appears consistent 
with the hypothesis that more important individuals may prefer to remain more detached from the 
operational core of the criminal activities, in order to reduce the risk of detection (Morselli 2010). 
High status individuals did not maintain control over the criminal activities through a better control of 
indirect connectivity (this would have resulted in higher betweenness centrality), but relying on their 
higher social status within the mafia-type organizations. This is consistent with Paoli (2002b), who 
argued that the roots of mafia-type organizations lie in particularly strong relations based on shared 
culture and kinship.  
The structure observed in the two groups provided particular strength to the ‗Ndrangheta 
organizations. Medium status individuals were more central, but also more easily replaceable with 
other, readily available, affiliates, to restore the criminal trade (Carley, Krackhardt, and Lee 2002). 
For example, in Stupor Mundi, N24 was arrested by the police during a smuggling operation. Other 
traffickers, such as N25 (N24‘s brother) and N28, quickly mobilized and replaced the arrested node in 
the trafficking of cocaine. 
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Figure 1. Chalonero. Status score by task
a 
 
a
Node colours: black= high status class, grey= medium status class, white=low status class 
Node shapes: up triangle: boss, rounded square=member of the „Ndrangheta, circle: non member 
Node size: betweenness centrality 
Lines: solid black lines: ties with value > average valued degree (17), solid grey lines: ties with value > ½ valued degree (8), dotted grey lines: other ties  
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Figure 2. Stupor Mundi. Status score by task
a
 
a
Node colors: black= high status class, grey= medium status class, white=low status class 
Node shapes: up triangle: boss, rounded square=member of the „Ndrangheta, circle: non member 
Node size: betweenness centrality 
Lines: solid black lines: ties with value > average valued degree (53), solid grey lines: ties with value > ½ valued degree (27), dotted grey lines: other ties 
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4.2. Strategic positioning and outcome of the investigations and trials 
In the light of the previous results, it is possible to explore the relation between the network structure 
and the outcome of the investigations (accusation and arrest) and the trials (acquittal, conviction and 
sentencing).  
Concerning the outcome of the investigations, individuals in both groups were classified as non 
accused, accused-not-arrested, and arrested.
18
 Table 5 shows that that traffickers, members of the 
‗Ndrangheta and bosses were always accused (except for 2 out of 16 traffickers in Stupor Mundi). As 
for arrests, all bosses and members of the ‗Ndrangheta were arrested (except for one member in 
Chalonero). Traffickers were arrested much more frequently than non traffickers. Data on status 
appear less straightforward. Overall, the bivariate analysis of the status classes and the outcome of the 
investigation provided statistically significant, but weaker Chi square than task and hierarchy for 
Chalonero and non statistically significant results for Stupor Mundi. This may suggest that the status 
was less relevant in the determination of the outcome of the investigations. While law enforcement 
focused on traffickers and members/bosses of the ‘Ndrangheta, the status of individuals was less 
associated with accusation and arrest.  
Table 5. Task, hierarchy and status class per accused, accused (not arrested) and arrested 
individuals 
  
Chalonero  Stupor Mundi 
  
 
N/accused Accused Arrested χ2(p)  N/accused Accused Arrested χ2(p) 
Task 
Non trafficker 15 32 5 
17.5** 
 26 6 25 
7.2* 
Trafficker 0 3 6  2 1 13 
Hierarchy 
Non Member 15 34 0 
55.8** 
 28 7 8 
46.9** Member 0 1 6  0 0 24 
Boss 0 0 5  0 0 6 
Status 
High st. 3 3 4 
7.8** 
 7 2 14 
1.7 Medium st. 5 18 6  8 1 9 
Low st. 7 14 1  13 4 15 
Total 15 35 11 
 
 28 7 38  
**p< .01, *p< .05 
 
A focus on the outcome of the trials provides further insight. As already mentioned, information about 
the acquittal/conviction was available only for a limited number of individuals in the two groups. For 
this reason, the analysis of the judicial outcome concentrated only on Stupor Mundi, where 
information on convictions was available for 40 out of 46 accused individuals.  
The data show that traffickers, members of the ´Ndrangheta and bosses were frequently convicted (but 
for both groups the differences were not statistically significant) (Table 6). Indeed, also non 
traffickers and non members of the ‗Ndrangheta had high conviction rates (both above 50%). For 
traffickers, members and bossed of the ‗Ndrangheta, the mean sentence in months was statistically 
much higher than other individuals (Table 7). Interestingly, a different pattern emerges when looking 
at the status classes. Here, low status individuals were more frequently convicted. Low status 
individuals appear extremely vulnerable as to their conviction rate (14 out of 19). Indeed, this may 
                                                     
18
 In the Italian criminal justice system, criminal investigations actually finish some time after the 
arrest of the the most dangerous suspects, once the prosecution has wrapped up the evidence and 
formulated the indictment (richiesta di rinvio a giudizio). In practice, however, much evidence is 
gathered to request the arrest warrant. Therefore, this study focused on the part of criminal 
investigation ending with the arrest warrants.  
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relate to limited skills in reducing the risks associated with drug trafficking. Conversely, they received 
lower sentences (on average approximately 7 years and 9 months of imprisonment). As for 
sentencing, medium status individuals received the highest penalties (on average approximately 12 
years and 3 months), but with a conviction rate lower than the low status class (5 out of 10). This is 
consistent with the more central position in the criminal network, which in case of conviction may 
result in very serious punishment. High status individuals, have been convicted slightly more 
frequently than medium status ones (7 out of 11). However, their mean sentence was significantly 
lower (approx. 9 years and 3 months), with a difference of nearly 36 months.  
Table 6. Conviction per task, hierarchy and status class in Stupor Mundi network 
 
 
Acquitted Convicted χ2(p) 
N 14 26  
Task 
Non Trafficker 13 17 
3.6 
Trafficker 1 9 
Hierarchy 
Non member 6 7 
1.1 Member 7 16 
Boss 1 3 
Status class 
High status 4 7 
1.6 Medium Status 5 5 
Low Status 5 14 
**p< .01, *p< .05  
Table 7. Mean sentence (in months) per task, hierarchy and status class in Stupor Mundi 
network 
  Mean sentence (months) 
Task 
Non Trafficker 92.9** 
Trafficker 138.1** 
Hierarchy 
Non member 86.1** 
Member 96.5** 
Boss 225.3** 
Status class 
High status 111.7 
Medium Status 147.2 
Low Status 93.2 
**p< .01, *p< .05 
Note: the significance test refers to the differences of the mean sentence in months for each group of 
the task, hierarchy, status class (ANOVA). 
Overall, the results concerning the outcome of the investigations and of the trials shows that the 
strategic patterns identified in the previous section also reflect on the judicial outcome of the two 
operations. In particular, high status individuals, maintaining a more detached position within the 
network of Stupor Mundi, received lower sentences than medium status individuals (the most active 
players in the network) and lower conviction rates than low status individuals (the subjects usually 
carrying out the most risky activities, such as couriers).  
5. Conclusions 
This study analyzed two drug trafficking networks belonging to the ‗Ndrangheta and their internal 
structure. Differently from previous research, in the observed networks centrality measures were 
strongly correlated. This made it difficult to identify strategic positions within the criminal groups 
only through the analysis of centrality measures as in previous studies. For this reason, the study 
adopted multiple methodologies to identify the tasks and importance of the individuals in the criminal 
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groups. Not surprisingly, individuals classified as traffickers, members of the ‗Ndrangheta and bosses 
were more directly involved in the criminal activities and had higher centrality scores than other 
members. Although of interest, these findings did not show any trace of strategic positioning. 
Contrarily, the analysis of the status of the individuals, based on the content analysis of the 
conversations, allowed to identify a different pattern of network positioning. In both networks, 
individuals with high status remained more detached from the core of the criminal activities, leaving 
medium status individuals in central, and more vulnerable, positions. The identified strategic 
positioning patterns provided particular strength to the ‗Ndrangheta networks. Indeed, medium status 
individuals could be (and in one occasion actually were) more easily replaceable with other affiliates, 
quickly resuming criminal activities at the previous levels. High status individuals showed to have 
particularly strategic connections (lower clustering coefficients despite the smaller size of their 
neighborhood). Further research may explore whether these connections could function as weak ties, 
providing more opportunities and resources than the stronger ties of medium status individuals 
(Granovetter 1973, 1983).  
The study further compared the structure of the two groups with the outcome of the investigations 
(accusation and arrest) and of the trial (acquittal or conviction). While in both groups task and 
hierarchy were strongly associated with higher accusation and arrest rates, this was not the same for 
the status of individuals. This suggests that individuals with higher status were not more frequently 
accused and arrested compared to traffickers and bosses. Furthermore, in Stupor Mundi, high status 
individuals were not more frequently convicted than others. In particular, they received lower mean 
sentences than medium status individuals. This analysis suggests that the strategic positioning pattern 
identified in the ‗Ndrangheta networks actually reflects on the outcome of the criminal proceedings.  
In conclusion, this study identified the particular network structure in two mafia-type organizations. 
Results also show that when degree and betweenness centrality substantially overlap, which is likely 
to be the most frequent situation as with most social networks, alternative methods may be used to 
uncover the strategies of some criminal leaders to reduce the risk of detection and punishment.  
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